Bovkun v. US Atty Gen by unknown
2002 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-8-2002 
Bovkun v. US Atty Gen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002 
Recommended Citation 
"Bovkun v. US Atty Gen" (2002). 2002 Decisions. 161. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/161 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
       Filed March 8, 2002 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 01-2180 
 
MIKHAIL BOVKUN, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 
       Respondent 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW 
OF AN ORDER OF THE 
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
SERVICE 
 
Argued: January 17, 2002 
 
Before: ALITO and ROTH, Circuit Judges, and 
SCHWARZER,* Senior District Judge 
 
(Filed: March 8, 2002) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior District Judge for the 
       Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 
 
  
       Tatiana S. Aristova, Esq. (Argued) 
       1760 Market St., Suite 1100 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
       Counsel for Petitioner 
 
       David V. Bernal 
       Assistant Director 
       Nelda C. Reyna (Argued) 
       Trial Attorney 
       Lyle D. Jentzer 
       U.S. Department of Justice 
       Office of Immigration Litigation 
       P.O. Box 878 
       Ben Franklin Station 
       Washington, D.C. 20004 
 
       Counsel for Respondent 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is a petition for review of a final administrative order 
of removal issued by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service under Section 238(b) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. S 1228(b). The respondent 
contends that we lack jurisdiction to entertain this petition 
by virtue of INA Section 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252(a)(2)(C), which deprives us of jurisdiction to review a 
final administrative order of removal if the petitioner is "an 
alien who is removable by reason of having committed," 
inter alia, "a criminal offense covered in[8 U.S.C. 
S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)]." We have held, however, that in a case 
such as this we may properly review the threshold question 
whether a petitioner has been convicted of an offense that 
deprives us of jurisdiction. See Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 
246 (3d Cir. 2001). We thus examine that question and 
hold that the petitioner has been convicted of such an 
offense. 
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I. 
 
The petitioner, a citizen of Ukraine, was paroled into the 
United States in 1992 but was never admitted for lawful 
permanent residence. In February 1998, he was charged by 
criminal complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie 
County Pennsylvania with the crime of making terroristic 
threats, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 2706 (1998).2 
The complaint charged that the petitioner had threatened 
to kidnap and kill the child of a police officer. It stated that 
this threat was made "in an attempt to stop [the officer] 
from taking official action in his capacity as a police officer, 
to wit: arrest the defendant on outstanding warrants." App. 
at 56. In October 1998, the petitioner pled guilty to this 
offense and was sentenced to imprisonment for 11 to 23 
months. 
 
In October 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service instituted expedited removal proceedings against 
the petitioner under INA S 238(b), 8 U.S.C.S 1228(b), by 
serving him with a Notice of Intent to Issue Final 
Administrative Removal Order ("the Notice"). App. at 7. The 
Notice recited the following: 
 
       You were, on November 22, 1999, convicted in the 
       Court of Common Pleas for Erie County, Pennsylvania 
       for the offense of Terroristic Threats in violation Section 
       2706 of the Pennsylvania Criminal Code for which the 
       term of imprisonment imposed was 11 and one-half 
       months to 23 months. 
 
App. at 7. Under the caption "Charge," the Notice stated: 
"You are deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the 
[INA], as amended, because you have been convicted of an 
aggravated felony as defined in section 101(a)(43) (G) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)" (emphasis added). App. at 7. 
Thereafter, a final administrative removal order was issued 
under INA S 238(b). App. at 1. In this order, the acting 
district director found, among other things, that the 
petitioner had "a final conviction of an aggravated felony as 
defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the[INA], 8 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The complaint also charged a violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 2906(a)(1), criminal coercion. 
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1101(a)(43)" (emphasis added). App. at 1. This petition 
followed. 
 
II. 
 
A. Jurisdiction To Review A Final Administrative Order Of 
Removal 
 
Under INA Section 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. S 1252(a)(2)(C), 
we lack jurisdiction to review petitioner's final 
administrative order of removal if he is "an alien who is 
removable by reason of having committed," inter alia, "a 
criminal offense covered in [8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)]." 
This latter provision states that "[a]ny alien who is 
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after 
admission is deportable." 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The 
term "aggravated felony" includes "a crime of violence (as 
defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a purely 
political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [sic] at 
least one year."3 8 U.S.C.S 1101 (a)(43)(F). Under 18 U.S.C. 
S 16(a), an offense is a "crime of violence" if it "has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another." 
Thus, if the petitioner in this case has been convicted of an 
offense that has such an element, we lack jurisdiction to 
entertain his petition for review. 
 
B. Erroneous Citation In Final Administrative Order Is Not 
Prejudicial 
 
The petitioner first argues that the final administrative 
order of removal is flawed because it found that the 
petitioner was convicted of "an aggravated felony as defined 
in section 101(a)(43)(G)" (hereinafter INA "subsection (G)"). 
Subsection (G) states that the term "aggravated felony" 
encompasses "a theft offense (including receipt of stolen 
property) or burglary offense for which the term of 
imprisonment [sic] at least one year." 8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(43)(G). Since the crime of making terroristic threats 
is obviously not "a theft offense", the petitioner contends 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. There is a "scrivener's error" in this provision. See United States v. 
Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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that the final administrative order of removal rests upon a 
plainly incorrect finding. 
 
The respondent contends that the citation to subsection 
(G) was a clerical error and that it is apparent that the 
order meant to refer to INA S 101 (a)(43)(F), which provides 
that the term "aggravated felony" includes"a crime of 
violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not 
including a purely political offense) for which the term of 
imprisonment [sic] at least one year." 8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(43)(F). The respondent points out that the Notice 
recited that removal was being sought based on the 
petitioner's conviction for making terroristic threats, not a 
theft offense, and that the petitioner was not prejudiced in 
any way by the clerical error. 
 
We agree with the respondent that the erroneous citation 
in the order of removal cannot surmount the jurisdictional 
restriction in INA S 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C.S 1252(a)(2)(C). 
The petitioner does not dispute the fact that he was 
convicted for the offense of making terroristic threats; he 
does not allege that the erroneous citation confused him 
regarding the basis on which deportation was being sought 
or that he was prejudiced by the citation in any other way; 
and he has not cited any authority for the proposition that 
an error of this type is sufficient to permit us to entertain 
his petition. 
 
Under these circumstances, we hold that the obviously 
erroneous citation is insufficient to circumvent the 
jurisdictional restriction in INA S 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252(a)(2)(C). Even in a criminal indictment-- where 
formality of pleading is at its height -- an error in the 
citation of the charged offense "shall not be ground for 
dismissal of the indictment . . . or for reversal of a 
conviction if the error . . . did not mislead the defendant to 
the defendant's prejudice." Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 7(c)(3). It 
would be anomalous to apply a stricter rule in this context. 
We thus reject the petitioner's argument regarding the 
citation and move on to the chief issue in this proceeding, 
namely, whether the petitioner's conviction for making 
terroristic threats qualifies as a crime of violence. 
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C. Conviction For Making Terroristic Threats Meets Definition 
Of "Crime Of Violence" 
 
As noted, the term "crime of violence" is defined in 18 
U.S.C. S 16(a) to mean, among other things,"an offense 
that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another." At the time of the petitioner's 
conviction,4 the crime of making terroristic threats was 
defined as follows: 
 
       A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree 
       if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with 
       intent to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a 
       building, place of assembly, or facility of public 
       transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public 
       inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of 
       causing such terror or inconvenience. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 2706 (1998). 
 
The petitioner argues that his conviction for terroristic 
threats does not qualify as a "crime of violence" because 
S 2706 did not necessarily require "the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force." Instead, the petitioner 
contends, "[m]ere `public inconvenience,' or `reckless 
disregard' of `causing such inconvenience' would be 
sufficient." Pet. Br. at 9. The petitioner's reading of S 2706 
confuses its actus reus and its mens rea. 
 
The actus reus of this offense is a "threat[ ] to commit a 
crime of violence," and the mens rea is either (1) the intent 
to terrorize another or reckless disregard of causing such 
terror or (2) the intent to cause, or reckless disregard of the 
risk of causing, either (a) the evacuation of certain facilities 
(a building, place of assembly, or facility of public 
transportation) or (b) some other serious public 
inconvenience. Because the actus reus must be shown in 
every case, Section 2706 always demands proof of a 
"threat[ ] to commit a crime of violence." The Pennsylvania 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As a result of amendment in 1998, the language noted in the text has 
been designated as 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 2706(a) and has been subdivided 
into subsections (1)-(3). It does not appear, however, that the meaning of 
the provision was altered. 
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Legislature has not defined the meaning of the term"crime 
of violence" as it is used in Section 2706, and therefore the 
term is to be "construed according to the fair import of [its] 
terms." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 105; see also Commonwealth v. 
Ferrer, 423 A.2d 423, 424 (Super. Ct. 1980). We have found 
no state case holding that the term, as used in Section 
2706, includes any offense that does not have as an 
element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another." 
18 U.S.C. S 16(a). We thus hold that the petitioner's 
conviction for making terroristic threats meets the 
definition in 18 U.S.C. S 16(a).5  
 
D. "Term Of Imprisonment" Is At Least One Year 
 
The petitioner argues that his offense does not qualify as 
one "for which the term of imprisonment [sic] at least one 
year" because his minimum sentence was 11 months. We 
disagree. 
 
In United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999), 
we noted that INA S 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.S 1101(a)(43)(G), 
which also refers to an offense "for which the term of 
imprisonment [sic] at least one year,""is obviously missing 
a crucial verb." 163 F.3d at 789. We went on to interpret 
this phrase to refer to the term of imprisonment that is 
actually imposed and not to the statutory minimum, as the 
defendant in Graham suggested. 169 F.3d at 789-90. The 
provision at issue in the case now before us, INA 
S 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(F), contains the same 
language and the same scrivener's error as the provision in 
Graham, and thus Graham's analysis governs here. We 
must therefore determine what is the term of imprisonment 
actually imposed when the sentence specifies a minimum 
and maximum sentence. 
 
In doing this, we believe that we should attempt to 
ensure that a sentence with both a minimum and a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 2706 derives from the Model Penal Code, which describes it as 
one of "[t]he offenses . . . deal[ing] with bodily injury short of 
homicide 
and with certain other situations where such injury is attempted, 
threatened or risked." Model Penal Code Pt. II, Art. 211, Explanatory 
note for sections 211-211.3 (1985). 
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maximum term is treated comparably with a functionally 
equivalent sentence with only a maximum term. Taking this 
approach, we believe that the petitioner's Pennsylvania 
sentence is comparable to a simple sentence of 23 months. 
"Under Pennsylvania law, the minimum term imposed on a 
prison sentence merely sets the date prior to which a 
prisoner may not be paroled." Rogers v. Pennsylvania Bd. of 
Probation & Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 321 n. 2 (Pa. 1999) 
(emphasis in original deleted); see also 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 331.21. Accordingly, petitioner's sentence of 11 to 23 
months meant that he had to serve at least 11 months and 
would not serve more than 23 months. This sentence was 
functionally the same as a sentence of 23 months, with 
parole eligibility beginning after 11 months. By contrast, 
petitioner's sentence was not at all comparable to a simple 
sentence of 11 months. Under a simple sentence of 11 
months, he would have been guaranteed release from 
prison at the expiration of 11 months, and upon release he 
would not have been subject to any of the restrictions that 
commonly accompany parole. We therefore treat the 
petitioner's sentence for present purposes as if it were a 
simple sentence of 23 months, and thus the sentence 
actually imposed was obviously for more than one year. 
 
E. Misdemeanor Under State Law May Constitute An 
Aggravated Felony 
 
The petitioner's final argument is that his conviction for 
making terroristic threats was not an "aggravated felony" 
because the offense is graded as a misdemeanor under 
state law.6 This argument is foreclosed by our holding in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In making this argument, the petitioner relies on the Board of 
Immigration Appeals' decision in In re Robin Juraine Crammond, 23 I & 
N Dec. 9 (BIA Mar. 22, 2001) ("Crammond I"), in which the BIA held that 
under INA S 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(A), an offense must be 
a felony under state law to qualify as an "aggravated felony." We note, 
however, that the BIA later vacated Crammond I . See In re Robin Juraine 
Crammond, 23 I & N Dec. 179 (BIA Oct. 16, 2001). Moreover, Crammond 
I concerned the interpretation of a provision, INA S 101(a)(43)(A), 8 
U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(A), that lacks the requirement that a sentence of at least 
one year be imposed. The effect of Crammond I  was to prevent crimes 
that were regarded by the jurisdiction of conviction as relatively minor 
from being treated as aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. 
Under the provision at issue in the present case, the requirement that a 
sentence of at least one year be imposed serves this purpose. 
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Graham that a conviction for a state misdemeanor may 
constitute an "aggravated felony" under INA Section 
101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(G), if a term of 
imprisonment of at least one year is imposed. As previously 
noted, the critical language in the statutory provision that 
is relevant here, INA S 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(F), is identical to the language of the provision 
construed in Graham, and consequently Graham is 
controlling in this case. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons explained above, we hold that the 
petitioner is an alien who is removable by reason of having 
committed a crime of violence, and we therefore lack 
jurisdiction to entertain his petition. Thus, his petition for 
review is dismissed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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